- Some useful books
Avinash Dixit (2004), Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press.
Jean-Jacques Laffont (1988), Fundamentals of Public Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Andreu MasColell, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
Hervé Moulin (2003), Fair Division and Collective Welfare, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hervé Moulin, (1989), Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (2020), Models in Microeconomic Theory, Open Book Publishers.
John E. Roemer (1996), Theories of Distributive Justice, Harvard University Press.
Bernard Salanié (2000), The Microeconomics of Market Failures, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Some journal articles
Richard Arnott, André de Palma and Robin Lindsey (1993), “A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand”, American Economic Review, 83, 161-179.
Mark Bagnoli and Barton Lipman (1989), “Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” Review of Economic Studies, 56, 583-601.
Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary (2017), “Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature”, Journal of Economic Literature, 55(1), 5-48.
Bryan Ellickson, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer and William Zame (1999), “Clubs and the Market,”Econometrica, 67, 1185-1217.
Oliver D. Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997), “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and Application to Prisons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1127-1161.
Fabian Lange and Robert Topel (2006), “The Social Value of Education and Human Capital,” chap. 8 in: Eric Hanushek and Finnis Welch eds., Handbook of Economics of Education, volume 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Sang Yoon Lee, and Ananth Seshadri (2016), “On the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Status”, University of Wisconsin-Madison, mimeo, forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy.
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), “Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 351-367.
Rafael Rob (1989), “Pollution Claim Settlements under Private Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 47, 307-333.
Suzanne Scotchmer (2002), “Local Public Goods and Clubs,” chap. 29 in: Auerbach and Feldstein, eds,Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 4, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Yves Sprumont (1991), “The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule”, Econometrica, 59, 509-519.
Hal R. Varian (1994), “A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed,”American Economic Review, 84, 1278-1293.
Gabrielle Fack and Julien Grenet (2010), “When do Better Schools Raise Housing Prices? Evidence from Paris Public and Private Schools,” Journal of Public Economics, 94, 59-77.
Denis Fougère, Francis Kramarz, Julien Pouget (2009), “Youth Unemployment and Crime in France,”Journal of the European Economic Association, 7, 909-938.
Carol Propper and John Van Reenen (2010), “Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, 118, 222-273.
H. Peyton Young (1987), “On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities”,Mathematics of Operations Research, 12(3), 398-414.
H. Peyton Young (1987), “Progressive Taxation and the Equal Sacrifice Principle”, Journal of Public Economics, 32, 203-214.