Dynamics of Information and Communication in Games


Objective

STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS REVOLVING AROUND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO STUDY HOW INFORMATION IS SPREAD AMONG RATIONAL AGENTS, WHAT ARE THE OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE STRATEGIES, HOW DOES STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AFFECT THE QUALITY AND RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION. 
WE WILL FIRST REVIEW THE MODELS OF STRATEGIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. THEN, WE WILL STUDY IN DETAILS SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES WHERE PLAYERS ARE EITHER INFORMATION DISCLOSERS OR DECISION MAKERS. WE WILL CONSIDER STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES AND VARIOUS FORM OF COMMUNICATION: MEDIATED OR UNMEDIATED, WITH OR WITHOUT COMMITMENT OR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY.
THE COURSE WILL START WITH SEMINAL RESULTS AND GO UP TO CUTTING EDGE RESEARCH. STUDENTS WILL STUDY RECENT RESEARCH PAPERS.
 

Planning

  • MODELS OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION: SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES, CHEAP TALK AND BAYESIAN PERSUASION.
  • MEDIATED COMMUNICATION: COMMUNICATION AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA.
  • REPEATED SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES: PERSISTENT PRIVATE INFORMATION, INFORMATION RENEWAL.
  • COMPETITIVE INFORMATION TRANSMISSION, EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
     

Assesment : Each student will read a research paper, write a report on it and make an oral presentation in front of the class.

Références

Jackson (2010), Social and Economic Networks, Princeton.
Mailath and Samuelson (2006), Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford.
Maschler, Solan and Zamir (2013) Game Theory, Cambridge.