- Philippe Choné - CREST-LEI
- Philippe Février - CREST-LEI
- Laurent Linnemer - CREST-LEI
- Thibault Vergé - CREST-LEI
Course : 24 hours
Objectives
This course is the first part of the Advanced Industrial Organization sequence which continues in the second semester with Advanced Industrial Organization 2. It is highly recommended to take both courses. The objective of the course is to provide an advanced presentation of some important topics of Industrial Organization (in a wide sense). For each topic that will be covered in this course, both theory and empirical applications will be discussed. The presentation of a topic will usually start with a discussion of some recent theoretical papers (or surveys of the theoretical literature on the topic), before moving on to empirical applications where the relevant econometric techniques will be presented. The reading list provided below is designed to help students identify important relevant papers. It thus also covers material that will not necessarily be discussed (in detail) during the course.
Outline
- Auctions
• Athey, Susan and Philip Haile (2002), “Identification of standard auction models”, Econometrica, 70, 2107-2140.
• Guerre, Emmanuel, Isabelle Perrigne and Quang Vuong (2000), “Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions”, Econometrica, 68, 525-574.
• Hendricks, Ken and Robert Porter (2007), “An Empirical Perspective on Auctions”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 3), Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter Eds., North-Holland.
• Krishna, Vijay (2002), Auction Theory, Academic Press.
• Milgrom, Paul (2004), Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.
- Adverse selection
• Chiappori, Pierre-André and Bernard Salanié (2000), “Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78.
• Leslie, Philip (2004), “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theatre”, RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 520-541.
• Stole, Lars (2007), “Price Discrimination and Competition”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 3), Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter Eds., North-Holland.
• Varian, Hal (1989), “Price Discrimination”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 1), Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willing Eds., North-Holland.
• Wolak, Frank (1994), “An econometric analysis of the asymmetric information, regulator-utility interaction”, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 34, 13-69.
- Competition
• Bresnahan, Timothy F. (1989), “Empirical studies of industries with market power”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 1), Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig Eds., 1011-1058, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
• Chen, Yongmin and Michael Riordan (2008), “Price-Increasing Competition”, Rand Journal of Economics.
- Differentiated products and Mergers
• Berry, Steven T. (1994), “Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation”, Rand Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-262.
• Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1995), “Automobile prices in market equilibrium”, Econometrica, 63(4), 841-890.
• Choné, Philippe and Laurent Linnemer (2008), “Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(4), 913-929.
• Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro (1990), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”,American Economic Review, 80(1), 107-126.
• Gowrisankaran, Gautam (1999), “A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers”, Rand Journal of Economics, 30, 56-83.
• Kamien, Morton and Israel Zang (1990), “The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 465-499.
• Kamien, Morton and Israel Zang (1991), “Competitively Cost Advantageous Mergers and Monopolization”, Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 323-338.
• Ivaldi, Marc and Frank Verboven (2005), "Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, 669-691.
• Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, MIT Press (chapter 5).
- Collusion and Cartels
• Athey, Susan and Kyle Bagwell (2008), “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks”, Econometrica, 76, 493-540.
• Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell and Chris Sanchirico (2004), “Collusion and Price Rigidity”, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 317-349.
• Aubert, Cécile, William Kovacic and Patrick Rey (2006), “The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 1241-1266.
• Bond, Eric and Constantinos Syropoulos (2008), “Trade-cost and Multimarket Collusion”, Rand Journal of Economics, 39, 1080-1104
• Ellison, Glenn (1994), “Theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee”, Rand Journal of Economics, 25(1), 37-57.
• Harrington, Joseph (2008), “Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 56, 215-246.
• Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, MIT Press (chapter 4).
• Miller, Nathan (2009), “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement”, American Economic Review, 99, 750-768.
• Porter, Robert H. (1983), “A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-1886”, The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 301-314.
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